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NOTES

Cost Conscious Justice: The Case for WhollyInformed Discretionary Sentencing in Kentucky
Emily M. Grant'
Kentucky is in the midst ofa budget crisis that has no foreseeable
termination date and, at the same time, is suffering from chronic
prison overcrowding that is almost sure to get worse before it
gets better. Sooner or later (and probably sooner), lawmakers
will have to confront the undeniable connection of these two
factors and undertake a full examination of the state's aggressive
incarceration practices!
INTRODUCTION

S INCE that observation was made eight years ago by Robert G. Lawson,
Professor of Law at the University of Kentucky, the nation has suffered
a crippling economic recession and, in 2010, recorded the highest national
debt in the last twenty years. 3 In the midst of immense budget shortfalls,
America's incarceration costs continue to skyrocket. It is not surprising
that the recent financial crisis has attracted an increased level of attention
to the nation's allocation of fiscal resources and its costly incarceration
practices called into question. In the words of former White House Chief
of Staff Rahm Emanuel, "Never let a serious crisis go to waste .... [I]t's
an opportunity to do things you couldn't do before."'4 Albeit controversial,
Emanuel's words ring true when considered in the context of reforming
the failed and costly sentencing policies that today prevail in courtrooms
nationwide. Now is the time to seize the opportunity to replace these
failed practices with cost-conscious alternatives and finally curb America's
insatiable appetite for incarceration.
As a result of shrinking revenues and ever increasing inmate populations,

I JD, 20i 2, University of Kentucky College of Law. The author would like to sincerely
thank Professor Robert G. Lawson for sharing his insight on this topic and offering constructive criticism throughout the composition process.
2 Robert G. Lawson, Difficult Times in Kentucky Corrections - Aftershocks of a "Tough on
Crime" Philosophy, 93 Ky.L.J. 305,333 (2004).
3 U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, DEBT POSITION AND ACTivrTY REPORT (2O00), available at
http://treasurydirect.gov/govt/reports/pd/pd-debtposactrpti io i .pdf.
4 A 4o-Year Wish List, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB 1233 104665145223o9.html.
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state correctional budgets are facing steep shortfalls.' The Commonwealth
of Kentucky has recently experienced one of the fastest-growing prison
populations in the country.6 It was reported in 2010 that, over the past decade,
Kentucky's inmate population had surpassed the national growth rate by
thirty-two percent.7 These figures are even more palpable and troubling
when converted into dollars. In 1990, the Commonwealth's spending on
incarceration totaled $140 million.' By comparison, Kentucky's yearly
incarceration spending registered at a staggering $440 million in 2010. 9
As the state is faced with its highest budget deficit on record, Kentucky's
draconian sentencing laws are crying out for reform.
Kentucky's heavy-handed approach to sentencing might be easier
to accept if supported, statistically or otherwise, by a need to combat an
increase in violent crime. However, the Commonwealth's correctional
budget spending, which is growing at a much higher rate than its total
government spending, appears to be unjustified in light of the fact that
Kentucky's serious crime rate is one of the lowest in the nation."0 As a matter
of fiscal responsibility, Kentucky must restructure its current sentencing
policies and seek out more cost effective alternatives to incarceration. To
remain blindly committed to these costly sentencing policies, which yield
incarceration rates that are largely disproportionate to Kentucky's relatively
low violent crime rates, places the Commonwealth on an unsustainable
path, both in terms of prison overcrowding for the criminal justice system
and financial burden on the taxpayers who support it.
When faced with similar struggles to control its inmate population and
incarceration costs, Kentucky's westward neighbor, Missouri, took action
by implementing a sentencing structure premised on the wholly-informed
discretion of its judges."' A comparison of the two neighboring states reveals
that they employ sentencing structures that are light years apart. While

5 SeeJack B rammer,Lawmaker:ChangingCriminalCodeWouldSave$6o,Million Overio Years,
LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, Jan. 20, 2011, http://www.kentucky.com/o 1/01o/16o42o2/

lawmaker-changing-criminal-code.html#more.
6 Id. .
7 See id.
8 Id.
9 Id.
I0 See THE LEAKY BUDGET, KENTUCKY CHAMBER OF COMMERCE 2 (February 2010) (available at http://www.kychamber.com/Dockycc i/governmentaffairs/LeakyBucket/LeakyBucketWhitePaper.pdf) (stating that state corrections spending has increased by 44% since 2ooo,
compared with total General Fund spending which has increased by 33%, and noting that
"while Kentukcy's incarceration rate was growing at a faster rate than the nation's, both its
violent and property crime rates fell, by 13 and 14% respectively").
1i See Press Release, Mo. Sentencing Advisory Comm'n, Report Shows Missouri's Use of
Recommended Sentences Reduces Recidivism Rates, Prison Population (Oct. 15, 2007), availableat
http://www.mosac.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=45463 [hereinafter Press Release, Mo. Sentencing Advisory Comm'n].
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Kentucky seeks to ensure that criminal offenders receive "just deserts"'"
primarily through the use of rigid statutory rules that tightly restrict
judicial discretion, 3 Missouri relies fully on the use of wholly-informed
judicial discretion to promote both just sentencing practices and an
efficient allocation of limited state resources. 14 These differing approaches
taken by the two states have yielded opposite outcomes: while both the
prison population and yearly cost of incarceration in Kentucky continue
to rise, Missouri's incarceration rate saw a continual decline in the two
years following the implementation of its wholly-informed discretionary
sentencing system in 2005."5
This Note seeks to shed light on the failing criminal justice laws and
policies that have largely contributed to Kentucky's budget crisis and
proposes a new direction in the Commonwealth's approach to sentencing.
Part I briefly examines the shift in sentencing policy that has led to the
upward trend in incarceration rates that currently plagues notonly Kentucky,
but also states nationwide. Part II introduces the rule-discretion continuum
and focuses on the differing impacts that the rival sentencing structures
have on incarceration rates. Finally, Part III outlines both the economic and
social benefits of the wholly-informed discretionary sentencing model that
has been successfully implemented in the neighboring state of Missouri
and advocates for the adoption of similar reforms in Kentucky.
I. THE ROOT OF THE PROBLEM

A. The Shiftfrom Rehabilitativeto RetributiveSentencing Policy
In light of America's current appetite for incarceration, one might find
it surprising to learn that the dominant sentencing approach adopted
by American courts beginning in the nineteenth century and enduring
throughout the majority of the twentieth century was one premised on the
rehabilitation of offenders. 6 This rehabilitative approach afforded both
federal and state trial judges "nearly unfettered authority to impose on
[criminal] defendants any sentence from within the broad statutory ranges

12 Lawson, supra note 2, at 317 (quoting Model Penal Code arts. 6 & 7 introductory cmt.
at 13 (1985) ("The theory of just deserts was that an offender should receive in punishment as
much as, and no more than he deserves.")) (internal quotation marks omitted).
13 See id. at 337-39 (discussing the four statutory provisions within Kentucky's persistent
felony offender law that have the strongest impact on constraining judicial discretion).
14 See Michael A. Wolff, Missouri's Information-Based Discretionary Sentencing System, 4
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 95, 96 (2oo6).
i5 Id.
16 Douglas A. Berman, Foreword:Beyond Blakely and Booker: PonderingModernSentencing
Process,95 J.CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 653, 654 (2005).
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provided for criminal offenses."17 After all, it was widely accepted that
the end goal-rehabilitation of offenders-would be achieved primarily
through tailoring punishments to fit their individualized treatment needs,
and the chief mechanism to facilitate this was through judicial discretion. 8
The generally tumultuous times and notorious crime wave of the 1960s,
however, greatly contributed to a drastic alteration in American sentencing
jurisprudence.19 The increasing crime rates cast doubt upon the overall
effectiveness of the rehabilitative model of corrections. 0 By the 1970s, the
American public favored a "law and order" approach to sentencing that
would utilize considerably harsher punishments in an effort to reestablish
order in society.2" Mounting concerns expressed by criminal justice scholars
regarding the unpredictability and potential disparate sentencing produced
by such highly discretionary practices gave momentum to a budding reform
movement focused on establishing a system premised on certainty and
consistency."2 Judge Marvin Frankel dubbed the problem posed by allowing
judges to brandish such tremendous sentencing power as "lawlessness in
sentencing." To address these concerns of disparate sentencing in America,
Frankel called for the adoption of a "code of penal law" and the creation of
a special "Commission on Sentencing" agency.2 3
Conservative politics also played a heavy role in the nation's shift from
rehabilitative sentencing practices to the "lock 'em up and throw away the
key" mentality that prevails today 4 Advocates on the political right led
the charge arguing that "criminals generally could not be rehabilitated, it
was pointless to attempt most treatments, and the only realistic solution
was to incapacitate a criminal through the use of incarceration." 5 Congress
embodied the tough-on-crime movement into legislation with its passage
of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which led to the creation of the
United States Sentencing Commission and its comprehensive guidelines
for federal sentencing. 6 State legislatures responded to the calls for reform
as well by greatly restricting judicial discretion through the enactment
17 Id.
18 Id. ("Such broad judicial discretion ... was viewed as necessary to ensure that
sentences could be tailored to the rehabilitative prospects and progress of each offender.").
19 Lawson, supra note 2, at 314. ("Violence in the streets, burning and looting in inner
cities, and rioting in a major prison system combined with [the assassinations of prominent

Americans] ...
to create a much greater public fear of crime.., and a very intense resentment
of criminals.").
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Berman, supra note 16, at 655.
23 Id. at 656-57.
24

History (How Did We Get Here?), RIGHT ON

CRIME,

http://www.rightoncrime.com/the-

criminal-justice-challenge/history-how-did-we-get-here (last visited Dec. 28, 20 1).
25 Id.
26 Berman, supra note I6, at 658.
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of sentencing statutes that abolished parole, created narrow sentencing
ranges for particular classes of offenses, 7 and adopted mandatory minimum
penalties..18 Sadly, these politically motivated decisions that, at the time,
may have appeared to be relatively risk-free and isolated have had farreaching effects beyond that of mere political expediency.
The lingering aftershocks of the policy decisions of the 1970s and 1980s
have harshly affected the equitable administration of justice within the
states and have led to serious budgetary concerns. 9 One of the states in
which these negative impacts can be seen most prevalently is in Kentucky.3"
According to the PEW Center on the States, "[diespite a decline in the
prison population over the past two years, Kentucky has seen one of the
nation's fastest [incarceration) growths since 2000."31 Between 2000 and
2010, Kentucky's prison population has grown forty-five percent.32 The
Commonwealth's growth rate is tremendous, especially when compared
to the nation's total state prison population growth rate of only thirteen
percent.33 Moreover, since America first waged its war on crime, Kentucky's
prison population has grown a monumental 442 percent, from 3,723
inmates in FY 1980 to roughly 20,200 inmates in FY 2010. 34 This increase
in prison population does not come without a price: Whereas general fund
corrections spending was $117 million in 1989, it has since skyrocketed by
338 percent, totaling $513 million in FY 2009.3s
While these figures alone are cause for concern, it is more surprising
that the surge in Kentucky's prison population has been largely attributed
to a shift in policy decisions, not crime rates.36 For the past fifty years,
Kentucky's serious crime rate has been well "below that of the nation and
of other southern states." 3 7The PEW Center's statistics, however, point out

27

Id. at 657.

z8 Id. at 664.
29 See Lawson, supra note z, at 3 I8.
30 Press Release, The Pew Charitable Trusts, Kentucky to Partner with the Pew Center
on the States to Improve Public Safety, Contain Costs (Aug. i i, 2oo), availableathttp://www.
pewtrusts.org/news-room-detail.aspx?id=60365 [hereinafter Press Release, The Pew Charitable Trusts].
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id. Because Kentucky's crime rate is well below the national average, these statistics
indicate that the dramatic increase in Kentucky's incarceration rate as compared to the nation
as a whole is attributable to factors other than an increase in criminal activity. See infra text
accompanying note 37.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id. See THE LEAKY BUDGET, KENTUCKY CHAMBER OF COMMERCE 2 (February 2010)
(available at http://www.kychamber.com/Dockycci/governmentaffairs/LeakyBucketlLeakyBucketWhitePaper.pdf) ("According to FBI crime reports, Kentucky ranked 4oth in the rate

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 100

that the Commonwealth's incarceration rate is well above average: "The
2009 incarceration rate in Kentucky (484 per 100,000 residents) is higher
than the overall U.S. state incarceration rate (447 per 100,000 residents).
The higher incarceration rates are true for both males and females. In fact,
Kentucky has the sixth highest incarceration rate for females."38 Kentucky's
uniquely harsh penal code may help explain the disparity between crime
and incarceration rates.
B. The DetrimentalEvolution of the Kentucky PenalCode
Before examining the individual tough-on-crime policies that led
to the population explosion in Kentucky's correctional facilities, it is
important to point out that, like the national approach to sentencing,
the Commonwealth's approach has not always been so draconian. The
initial primary objective of the Kentucky Penal Code (the "Code") was
to maintain "the state's [long-held] . . . commitment to the rehabilitation
of offenders."39 An examination of its provisions supports the inference
that the Code was largely centered on discretion. For example, the 1974
Code afforded trial judges "virtually unlimited discretion" to use probation
as an alternative to imprisonment' and encouraged them to do so as
long as imprisonment of the offender was not deemed necessary as to
ensure public safety.4 1 Moreover, the provisions gave courts considerable
discretion to fix maximum penalties in cases "resolved by guilty pleas" and
authorized judges to use discretion "to reduce penalties fixed by juries to
lesser penalties" that better fit the individual crime. 4 As a result of the
provisions, parole boards enjoyed the authority to determine a convicted
felon's eligibility for parole. 43 Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the
Code did not constrain judicial discretion by providing for mandatory
minimum sentences for any offense. 4
The Code clearly reflected the following philosophies on
sentencing: 1) the state should impose the least rather than
the most intrusive of punishments, 2) society's long-term
interests are best served by restoring offenders to full status
in their communities as soon as possible, and 3) imprisonment
should never be allowed to become a routine or semiautomatic

of violent crime in 2oo6,the most recent year data is available.")

38 Id.
39 Lawson, supra note 2, at 334.
40 Robert G. Lawson, PFO Law Reform, A Crucial Step Toward Sentencing Sanity in Kentucky, 97 Ky. L.J. I,I1(2oo8) [hereinafter Lawson, PFO Law Reform].
41 Lawson, supra note 2, at 334.
42 Lawson, PFOLaw Reform,supranote 40, at i i.
43 Id. at 1o.
44 Id. at ii.
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It is quite evident that the aforementioned provisions in the Kentucky
Penal Code, if left unaltered, could not have produced the incarceration
boom that currently exists in the Commonwealth. 46 When the Kentucky
General Assembly modified-the existing Code shortly thereafter, however,
it became clear that these were philosophies of the past and signaled the
legislature's whole-hearted allegiance to the tough-on-crime movement.47
The sentencing weapon in Kentucky's well-stocked arsenal that most
harshly curtails judicial discretion and cries out loudest for reform is the
persistent felony offender (PFO) law.4" PFO laws are most commonly
described by the "baseball metaphor 'three strikes and you're out."' 49
"Three strikes" laws enhance' the "levels of imprisonment for [felonies
committed by] habitual offenders and specifically [provide] for sentences
of life imprisonment for commission of a third offense."" ° The 1974 session
of the Kentucky General Assembly produced one of the toughest "three
strikes" laws ever enacted by a state legislature."' In its current form,
Kentucky's "three strikes" law applies to nonviolent persistent felony
offenders in the first degree as follows:
If the offense for which he presently stands convicted is a Class C
or Class D felony, a persistent felony offender in the first degree
shall be sentenced to an indeterminate term of imprisonment,

the maximum of which shall5 2not be less than ten (10) years nor
more than twenty (20) years.
Therefore, under this law, persistent felony offenders who are convicted
of Class C or D felonies "may be sentenced to extended terms that double
the ordinary term of imprisonment provided for [such a felony] conviction." 3
This means that "a Class C felony committed by a non-persistent offender
carries a maximum term often years while a Class C felony committed by a
persistent offender carries a maximum term of twenty years."54
A number of provisions within Kentucky's "three strikes" law directly

45 Lawson, supra note 2, at 335-36.

46
47
48
49
50

Id. at 334.
Id. at 335-36.
Lawson, PFOReform, supra note 4o,at 6-7.
Id. at 7.
Lawson, supra note 2, at 335.

51 See Lawson, PFO Reform, supra note 40, at 9.
52 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 53z.o8o(6)(b) (West 2006 & Supp. 2011). A Class C felony carries a sentence of at least five but not more than ten years. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.020(1)(a)
(West 2oo6). A Class D felony carries a sentence of at least one but not more than five years.
§ 532.020(I)(b).
53 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.O80 cmt. (West 2006).
54 Id.
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restrict a judge's discretion in sentencing. One of the most glaringly
restrictive provisions states that "[ilf the offense the person presently stands
convicted of is a Class A, B, or C felony, the person shall not be eligible for
parole until the person has served a minimum term of incarceration of not
less than ten (10) years."5 5 This provision not only effectively forecloses a
judge's discretion to impose a sentence of probation, shock'probation, or
conditional discharge for all repeat offenders except Class D felons, but it
sentence of ten years before such an
also imposes a mandatory minimum
6
offender is eligible for parole.1
While the use of the three strikes law against violent offenders may be
justified, such long and costly incarcerations are unnecessary for nonviolent
offenders, who are often more dangerous to themselves than the public.
According to a field study conducted by Robert G. Lawson, Kentucky's laxf.
is "far more likely to be used against felony offenders who pose very little
if any threat to public safety (shoplifters, auto thieves, low-level burglars,
drug users, etc.)."57 This is exemplified by a case in Fayette County,
Kentucky, where a persistent felony offender, who stole goods valued at
less'than $300 was indicted on two counts of third degree burglary, a Class
D felony, carrying a sentence of one to five years.5 8 Her PFO status, derived
from the commission of prior nonviolent Class D felonies (possession of
forged instruments), imposed an additional charge of PFO in the first
degree and an enhanced penalty.5 9 Thus, her one year sentence "for third
degree burglary [was] ... enhanced to ten years by the PFO [law], and she
was [consequently] sent to prison for ten years for stealing less than $300
60
worth of goods.
The extensive reach of Kentucky's PFO law undoubtedly all but
guarantees population growth in the Commonwealth's already overcrowded
correctional facilities and an increased burden on the state budget.
According to the Kentucky Department of Corrections, the average cost61
to incarcerate one healthy inmate in FY 2006-2007 was $18,613 per year.
That number increased to $26,578 per year for an unhealthy or aging
inmate. 6 Therefore, under the current PFO law, the Commonwealth
of Kentucky spent about $186,130 to incarcerate the above mentioned
nonviolent offender for stealing a mere $300 worth of goods. That figure is
cause for concern to anyone with the slightest sense of fiscal responsibility.
And if that calculation does not stir up concern about the tremendous
55 § 532.080(7).
56 Lawson, PFOReform, supra note 40, at 13; § 532.o8o(7).
57 Lawson, PFOReform, supra note 40, at 31.
Id. at 21; Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 511.040(2) (West 2oo6).
Lawson, PFOReform, supra note 40, at 21.
Id.
Id. at 31.
62 Id. at 3 1 n. io9.
S8
59
60
61
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cost of Kentucky's predominant sentencing weapon of choice, this one
will: while the PFO law, when first enacted, produced only seventy-nine
enhanced sentences in 1980, by 2004 the number of PFO inmates serving
extended terms had. risen to an astounding 4,187.63 Considering that this
law is stil in full force today, and that it serves as an incentive for persistent
offenders to accept more severe sentences in exchange for dismissal of PFO
charges, 64 its far-reaching impact on increasing the sentences of the inmate
population and the cost to incarcerate them is practically immeasurable.
II. THE RULE-DISCRETION CONTINUUM

Despite the difficulty in reducing the exact impact of particular
sentencing policies down to dollars and cents, an examination of the
intricacies of a state's sentencing system can reveal a great deal about
the effect its laws and policies have on its incarceration rate.6" A state
sentencing system can be described as rule-based or discretion-based. 6
This distinction is dependent mostly on the degree of leeway afforded
to a judge in the sentencing process. Although this continuum concept
was first introduced by Kevin Reitz, Professor of Law at the University
of Minnesota, in questioning the impact of the Supreme Court's decision
in United States v. Booker on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, it is aptly
suited for examining the stark differences in the state sentencing policies
of Kentucky and Missouri and the consequential outcomes from the
67
enforcement of the contrasting laws that accompany each regime.
A. Reitz 'sContinuum of JudicialSentencing Discretion
Visualize a continuum that demonstrates the differences in sentencing
68
systems and ranges from zero on the left side to ten on the right side.
Position zero on the left side represents a sentencing system in which
judges are afforded primary discretion to hand down penalties so long as
they fall within a broad statutory range for felony offenses and are permitted
to consider individual facts and circumstances surrounding the defendant

63 Id. at 3.
64 See id. at 27-28.
65 See Kevin R. Reitz, The Enforceability of Sentencing Guidelines, 58 STAN. L. REv. 155,
158 (2005).
66 Id.
67 Id. at 156-57 (applying the "rule-discretion" continuum to argue that the impact of
the Booker decision on altering the command of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines from
.mandatory" to "advisory" was "far less radical" that it appeared to be on its face).
68 Id. Professor Reitz notes that no modern sentencing system fits squarely into position
zero or position ten on the continuum, but they can be characterized as falling within these
ranges. Id. at159.
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and the crime for which he is charged.6 9 Essentially, in a discretion regime
there are no rules circumscribing the judge's decision-making authority,
other than the maximum penalty prescribed by statute, which may not be
exceeded.70 It is also important to note that where judicial discretion reigns,
neither the legislature, sentencing commission, nor a reviewing court may
interfere with the trial judge's unfettered discretion." On the other end of
the continuum, at position ten, rests the rule-based system, one in which
judges' discretion is tightly. restricted in favor of legislative rules that
dictate "a fixed and specific punishment in every case, with no judicial
leeway permitted under any scenario."7 " In order words, "[alt position ten,
someone with systemwide competence. has mandated the exact sentencing
outcome of every case in advance of its litigation, and judges are mere
functionaries in the punishment process." 73
A system's position on the continuum is largely, if not wholly, determined
by the policy choices of and laws implemented by state legislatures.7 4 In
gauging sentencing authority, the initial examination should involve a look
at the sentencing recommendations set forth by the state legislature and
the statutory language granting or withholding judicial authority to deviate
from those recommendations.7" In legislative parlance, this deviation
authority is commonly referred to as "departure power."'7 6 Thus, the
more lenient the departure language, the more likely that the sentencing
scheme will fall on the discretion side of the continuum, or closer to
position zero.77 Conversely, if the statute employs an unyielding standard,
the sentencing structure will likely be considered to be one that restricts
judicial discretion and be placed on the rule end of the continuum, closer
to position ten." Additionally, several other important factors are at stake,
including, most obviously, the following: "(1) the breadth or narrowness of
statutory sentencing ranges and guidelines, (2) the simplicity or complexity
of factual considerations that must be fed into guidelines calculations, and
(3) the presence or absence of black-letter rules affixed to the sentencing
69 Id. at 158.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 158-59. See Wolff supra note 14, at ioo ("When it comes to influencing sentencing behavior, commissions near the 'rule' end of the rule-discretion continuum make their
rules and expect that they will be enforced.").
73 Id. at 159.
74 See id. (Professor Reitz notes that the utility of the continuum lies in its ability to
gauge the level of involvement of the legislature in the sentencing process. He would seem
to suggest that the more dominate the state legislature, the more likely the sentencing system
is to be rule-based.).
75 Id.

76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id.
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process."79 It then follows that sentencing structures that impose narrowed
statutory ranges, complex factual considerations (such as an offender's
prior criminal history), and highly prescriptive black letter rules (such as
mandatory minimum sentences) are considered to be rule-based."
B. The Reitz Continuum in Action - ContrastingKentucky andMissouri
It is quite evident from the examination in Part I of this Note that
Kentucky's use of mandatory minimums, extensive "three strikes"
prescriptions, and statutory provisions that constrain judicial discretion
in the use of probation and parole earn the system a position on the
rule-based side of the Reitz continuum."s For instance, the language of
Kentucky's "three strikes" law sharply prescribes a mandatory sentence
for persistent felony offenders and grants virtually no departure power to
sentencing judges.8" Furthermore, the law's narrow sentence ranges for
felony offenses, enhanced sentences based on prior criminal history, and
black letter mandatory minimum penalties imposed upon persistent felony
offenders convicted of Class A, B, or C felonies are all factors that constrain
judicial sentencing authority.8 3 The only departure power seemingly
granted by Kentucky statute pertains to modification of a jury sentence
deemed by the judge to be "unduly harsh." ' The judge in such cases
is permitted to reduce the jury's sentence, but only to the extent of the
minimum prescribed elsewhere in the statute for the offense in question.8"
Just in case there is any question as to the drafters' intent behind limited
departure provisions, Kentucky's Legislative Research Commission
specified in its commentary that this provision is intended to provide
86
"[clontrol over the judge's discretion."
Recognizing that "[n]o one seems to have proven that [rule based
systems are] effective' in promoting public safety by limiting judicial
79 Id. at 16o. Less conspicuous factors such as the cultural attitudes within the jurisdiction and "political crosscurrents between branches of government" should also be considered
in evaluating a sentencing approach as these extra-judicial factors may influence whether
judges (who are often elected by the legislature or the public) vested with departure power
choose to exercise it or refrain from deviating from statutory prescriptions for fear that such
action would be frowned upon as judicial activism. See id, at i6o, 166.
8o Id.
81 See supratext accompanying Part I.
82 See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.080(5)-(6) (West 2oo6 & Supp. 20 i).
83 See§ 532.080(7).
84 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 532.070(1) (West 2oo6).
85 Id. When one considers the extra-legal incentives such as political and cultural crosscurrents present in Kentucky, where trial judges are elected to the bench by the public, the
meager departure power afforded by statute carries even less weight because judges will
likely be reluctant to deviate from sentences prescribed by statute or a jury. See supra note 82.
86 See § 532.070 cmt (West 2oo6).
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discretion,"87 policymakers in Missouri have implemented a sentencing
scheme that is most contrary to the "one size fits all" approach taken by
its neighboring state of Kentucky. While Part III provides a more in depth
look of Missouri's sentencing structure,"' an initial examination reveals
characteristics that distinguish Missouri's practices from Kentucky's rulebased system. Most glaringly, the general Missouri sentencing law provides
for substantial judicial departure from the prescribed sentences for a given
offense based on the court's consideration of "all the circumstances, having
regard to the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
character of the defendant."8 9 Missouri judges are afforded additional
discretion in sentencing in the case of Class C and D nonviolent feloniesthe statute allows departure from the prescribed sentences for both classes
of felonies (a term not to exceed seven years for Class C and four years for
Class D) in the form of a substitute sentence of up to one year in the county
jail.9° Additionally, the breadth of Missouri's sentencing ranges offers
considerably greater flexibility in judicial decision-making and provides
for lower minimum terms of imprisonment for Class A and B felonies. For
instance, Missouri statutes provide a sentencing range of ten to thirty years
or life imprisonment for conviction of a Class A felony.91 Class B felonies
similarly carry a wider range of five to fifteen years of imprisonment.9
Compared to Kentucky's narrow sentence ranges and higher minimum
sentences for Class A and B felonies (twenty to fifty years imprisonment
or life and ten to twenty years imprisonment, respectively), 93 it is evident
that Missouri sentencing judges have greater discretionary tools at their
disposal. Finally, Missouri, like Kentucky, enforces a persistent felony
offender law. The Missouri PFO law, however, is advisory only - meaning
that the court may, based on the judge's assessment of the individual
facts and circumstances, sentence a persistent offender who has pleaded
guilty to or has been found guilty of an offense to an enhanced term of
imprisonment. 94
Having established that Kentucky's sentencing structure is
appropriately cast as a rule-based system, and that Missouri's is a whollyinformed discretionary system (meaning that the two lie at the opposite
ends of the continuum), the question now becomes: What effect does a
rule-based system have on fiscal efficiency? The obvious answer, if sheer
numbers are any indication, is that a rule based system costs the state more
87
88
89
9o
91
92
93
94

at o1.
Wolff, supra note I4,
See infra text accompanying Part III.
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 557.036(i) (West Supp. 2011).
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 558.Oi1 (West 1999).
Id.
Id.
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.O60 (LexisNexis 2008).
Mo. REV. STAT. § 558.OI6 (West Supp.201i).

20II-20121

COST CONSCIOUS JUSTICE

money. Under Kentucky's rule-based sentencing scheme, where judges
have no choice but to impose the heavy penalties prescribed by statute and
are afforded little to no departure power from those statutory mandates,
the result is a higher incarceration rate and extended terms for convicted
felons. It is simply intuitive that maintaining such a sentencing model
will yield higher correction costs than one like Missouri's where judges
have the flexibility to finely-tailor sentences to fit the profile of individual
criminalsg-thus avoiding the problem of imposing drastically harsh and
costly sentences only because they are required by mandatory minimums
or other rigid laws but where circumstances otherwise do not merit such
action. Undoubtedly, discretionary sentencing policies result in a lower
incarceration rate and shorter individual prison terms due to the utilization
of alternative sentences.
III.

THE CASE FOR ENHANCED JUDICIAL DISCRETION IN SENTENCING

A. An IntroductoryLook at Missouri's Wholly Informed Discretionary
Sentencing
The Missouri Sentencing Advisory Commission ("MOSAC") proudly
advertises that "[jiudicial discretion is the cornerstone of sentencing in
Missouri courts."96 Thus, as one would expect, the wholly discretionary
system of the aptly named "show me" state, which provides judges a
spectrum of information upon which to base their sentencing decisions,
lies on the opposite end of the rule-discretion continuum from that of
Kentucky's rule-based system.
MOSAC's stated purpose is to offer sentencing recommendations "that
will provide protection for society; promote certainty, consistency, and
proportionality of punishment; recognize the impact of crime on victims,
and encourage rationaluse of correctionalresourcesconsistentwith publicsafety."9 7
The commission is committed to the belief that "sentencing ...is at its
best when the decision makers have accurate and timely information about
the offender, the offenses and the options available for sentencing.""g
MOSAC seeks to achieve its goal of providing such information
through what is known as a Sentencing Assessment Report, which, prior to
sentencing a convicted offender, is made available to judges, prosecutors,
and defense counsel and contains information concerning:

95 td.

96 Recommended Sentencing User Guide 200 7-2oo8, Mo.

SENT'G ADVISORY COMM'N, 2 (Aug.
2007), http://www.mosac.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=45352.
97 Details on Boardor Commission, Mo. SENT'G ADVISORY COMM'N, http://governor.mo.gov/
boards/show/SENTENCE (last visited Oct. 4, 201 i) (emphasis added).
98 Recommended Sentencing User Guide 2007-2008, supra note 99.
31,
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(1) A rating of prior criminal history and the risk of re-offending,
by using the offender risk factors;
(2) An analysis of non-prison sentencing alternatives (where
appropriate);
(3) A recommendation for sentencing in accordance with these
Sentencing Recommendations;
(4) The percentage of the sentence that must be served before
the offender is eligible for a parole guideline release, and the
percent of sentence that offenders with that sentence and risk
rating actually served before parole.'
In 2010, MOSAC implemented further specialized information features
to assist judges in performing comparative analyses as to (1) "the likelihood
- under different sentencing options - that an offender with a specific prior
criminal history who commits a specific offense will be reincarcerated"
100
To predict the
and (2) the cost to the state of each sentence option.
likelihood of recidivism for a particular offender, MOSAC provides riskassessment ratings that "are based on [eleven] factors - including prior
criminal history, the crime committed, the offender's education, age and
employment status." 10 1 In performing the comparative cost analysis of
alternative sentences, the commission bases its assessment "on the average
daily expense of [incarceration] ... plus the cost of parole supervision after
prison [versus] . .. the cost of supervising the offender on enhanced or
regular probation."10 The cost comparison between prison and probation
yields a drastic but unsurprising deviation: a yearly prison sentence for
one offender costs $16,823; probation costs $1,354 per year; and enhanced
10 3
probation costs $1,792 per year.
To illustrate the system's mechanics, consider the following example:
l
Suppose an offender has been found guilty of second-degree robbery 4
In recommending a sentence, the system will take into account that the
offender is a twenty-year-old male with "no prior felonies . . . a high
school diploma[,] and ... a part-time job [that he has held for] the past two

99 Id.
ioo Sentencing Information on www.mosac.mo.gov Now Includes Costs of Recommended Sentences and Risks of Reincarceration,SMART SENT'G, I (Aug. 17, 201o), www.mosac.mo.gov/file.
jsp?id=455o2 [hereinafter Sentencing.Information].
ioI Id. at 2. Recidivism means incarceration due to a violation of supervision or committing a new offense within 2 years. Id.
ioz Id.
103 Id. The Missouri model offers what it calls "enhanced probation" or a "communitystructured sentence" which is a form of probation that requires intensive supervision (such
as home-based electronic monitoring) and imposes strict conditions on the offender, which
may include requiring him to attend "substance abuse or other community rehabilitative programs". Recommended Sentencing User Guide 2009-2010, Mo. SENT'G ADViSORY COMM'N, 4 (Oct.
29, 2009), http:// www.mosac.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=45346.
io4 Sentencing Information,supra note 1OO,at 2. (Second-degree robbery is defined as "a
class B felony that carries a maximum prison sentence of 15 years.").
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months." 105 Because he is suspected of substance abuse, however, he will
be assigned an "above-average" risk rating. 1°6
Using data about other similarly-situated offenders statewide, the
sentencing information will provide a presumptive sentence, a mitigating
1
sentence, and an aggravating sentence. 07
The presumptive sentence
is enhanced probation that, for five years, will cost the state $8,960 total
($1,792 per year). 108 The mitigating sentence is regular probation with a
five-year cost of $6,770 ($1,354 per year). 109 The aggravating sentence is
a five-year prison sentence, which would likely be reduced to 3.1 years
given this offender's profile. 110 This prison sentence would cost $54,724."'
The recidivism rate for like offenders is 39.6 percent. 112 As an alternative,
the recommended sentencing information provides for "shock probation,"
which is "a 120-day prison [sentence] followed by probation . .. [that]
has a recidivism rate of 39.2 percent."' 13 In any case, the judge retains full
discretion to impose the presumptive, mitigating, or aggravating sentence
based on the particular circumstances of the offender and his crime." 4
Now, suppose this same offender was convicted in Kentucky of the
same nonviolent felony, a Class C felony, but had a prior conviction of
criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree, a Class
D felony."' Under Kentucky's persistent felony offender law, the judge
would have no discretion in imposing a tailored sentence and would be
legislatively bound to sentence the offender to a mandatory minimum
term of incarceration of not less than 10 years.1 1 6 Only after completion of

105 Id.
io6 Id. MOSAC's "risk assessment" is a measure of "the risk of the offender committing
new offenses or other violations of supervision while on probation or parole." In cases where
the sentencing data produces an offender risk assessment of "above-average" or "average"
the MOSAC recommendation will be the presumptive sentence. Id at 4.
107 Id. at 2-3. A "presumptive" sentence is informed by statewide sentencing data and
the typical sentence handed down by Missouri judges for the offense in question. An "aggravated" or "mitigated" sentence is appropriate where, based upon the circumstances of a
particular crime or the unique risk presented by the offender, either a more or less severe
sentence is warranted. Id.at 2.
io8 Id. at 2.
IO9 Id.
11o Id.at 3.
111 Id.(This figure is reached by adding together 3.1 years in prison at $16,823 per year
plus 1.9 years on parole at $1,354 per year).
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Seeid. at2.
115 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 515.030 (West 2006) ("Robbery in the second degree is a Class
C felony."); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 516.o60(2) (West 2006) ("Criminal possession of a forged
instrument in the second degree is a Class D felony.").
116 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.080(7) (West zoo6 & Supp. 2011).
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that ten-year sentence would the offender be eligible for parole. "7 Thus,
the total estimated incarceration cost to the Commonwealth of Kentucky
would be $186,130 for the mandatory ten-year sentence, not including
parole expenses.1 1 8 Contrast that with $54,724, the total cost of the fiveyear aggravating sentence that the offender likely would have received in
Missouri." 9 The results are not only shocking to the conscience, but are
devastating to the Kentucky state budget.
B. Criticism andDefense of Wholly-Informed DiscretionarySentencing
Despite its cost-conscious approach to sentencing, which many states
find appealing as budgetary concerns continue to mount, Missouri's
sentencing structure has its critics. Opponents attack the Missouri model in
the same manner that Judge Frankel attacked the rehabilitative sentencing
practices of the twentieth century by arguing that discretionary sentencing
leads to disparate and unpredictable degrees of punishments that can be
disproportionate to the crime committed.2 0 In response to such criticism,
MOSAC's chair, former Missouri Supreme Court Chief Justice Michael
Wolff acknowledges that "discretionary sentencing systems have produced
disparate sentencing results that are somewhat determined by the personal
assumptions and characteristics of the sentencers." "I Judge Wolff, however,
argues: "What is often lacking is information - and the opportunity [for
judges and prosecutors] to improve their professional performances because they typically act in isolation."'2 2 It would, thus, appear that the
defects inherent in the use of a typical discretionary sentencing system are
uniquely tempered by MOSAC's utilization of all available information to
support a judge's exercise of discretion. 3
Furthermore, opponents of the discretionary approach are particularly
vocal on MOSAC's decision to make data regarding the comparative cost of
sentences as part of the information available to judges prior to sentencing.
Critics, especially prosecutors and the tough-on-crime crowd, argue that
"the cost of punishment is an irrelevant consideration when deciding a
criminal's fate and that there is a risk of overlooking the larger social cost of
Ii7 Id.
i 18 Lawson, PFO Law Reform, supra note 40, at 31 (citing the Kentucky Department of
Corrections statistics for the year 2006-2007 estimating that the average cost to incarcerate
one healthy inmate was $18,613 per year). A ten-year sentence at a cost of $18,613 per year
equals a total cost to the Kentucky taxpayers of $186,t3o.
119 Sentencing Information, supra note oo, at 3. Note that this comparison utilizes the
most costly sentence that would likely be handed down under the Missouri law and the least
expensive sentence that must be granted under Kentucky's PFO law.
12o Wolff, supra note 14, at 120.
121 Id.
122

Id.

123

Id.
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crime."" 4' The opposition's chief argument is focused on the rights of the
victim to have his wrongdoer brought to justice, and the threat posed to
public safety in allowing convicted criminals to forego a prison sentence."2 5
Allied in support of the system, however, are defense lawyers and
fiscal conservatives-unlikely bedfellows, to be sure-"who consider [the
system] an overdue tool that will force judges to ponder alternatives to
prison more seriously."1 16 Supporters of the system claim that judges would
never check their good judgment at the door and focus exclusively on the
cost of a sentence.2 7 Rather, sentencing costs would only be a consideration
in nonviolent cases, "circumstances where prison is not the only obvious
answer."'2 8 One Missouri judge argues, "[Cost] is one of a thousand things
we look at -

about the tip of a dog's tail, it's such a small thing .... [Ilt is

almost foolish not to look at it. We live in a what's-it-going-to-cost? society
now." 129

Because Missouri's cost comparison data program is such a recent
addition (as of August 2010)13 ° to its wholly-informed discretionary system,
figures that gauge its impact on reducing incarceration numbers have yet to
be released. Moreover, because there is no way to determine the subjective
weight a particular judge attributes to comparative cost information, it
may never be possible to quantify into dollars and cents the impact that
providing judges with such information has on prison populations and
correctional costs. Both supporters and opponents, though, agree that
MOSAC's cost revelation will undoubtedly raise awareness in the minds
of sentencing authorities as to the enormous price tag that accompanies
incarceration.'31
C. Success of the MissouriModel
In spite of a slight increase in prison population over the last year,
statistics show that since the implementation Missouri's wholly-informed
discretionary sentencing program six years ago, the state prison population
has decreased, the recidivism rate has declined and, resultantly, the
incarceration costs borne by taxpayers have lessened. 132From November

124

Monica Davey, Missouri Tells Judges Cost of Sentences, N.Y TIMES, Sept. 19, 201 o,at A i.

125

1Z6

td.
Id.

127

Id.

128

See id.

Id.(internal quotation marks omitted).
130 Id.
131 See id.
132 See Press Release, Mo. Sentencing Advisory Comm'n, supra note i i at i;Press Release, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Largest Increase in Prison and Jail Inmate Populations
Since Midyear 2000 (June 27, 2007), available at http:/bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/press/
129
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2005, when the statewide program went into effect, through August
2007, the state's prison population declined by nearly 810 inmates. 33
For perspective, consider that "[i]n the year before the new system was
implemented, Missouri's prison population increased by 855 [inmates]."''
Notably, at the close of FY 2006, the state's prison population decreased
by 2.9 percent - the largest margin in the nation-and Missouri was one of
only eight states to reduce its prison population.'35 Insofar as Missouri was
successful in decreasing its inmate population, the nation as a whole was
not: that same year, the number of state and federal inmates increased by
2.8 percent to roughly 1.56 million inmates, the largest increase since FY
2000.136

Missouri's sentencing structure has proven to be tremendously
successful in terms of reducing taxpayer costs. A recent National Institute
of Corrections report ranked Missouri among the states with the lowest
annual incarceration cost per inmate.'37 In 2008, Missourians paid $12,867
in incarceration costs per inmate, which is about forty-seven percent less
than taxpayers of other states nationwide."' Studies have also shown that
the commission's recommended sentencing reports have been accurate
in predicting the likelihood of recidivism based on its weighing of the
risk-assessment factors for each individual offender. 139 In cases where the
actual sentences given by courts agreed with the recommended sentences,
the number of repeat offenders was consistently lower. 140 For instance,
"[w]hen the recommended sentence is probation and the actual sentence is
also probation, which occurs in 77% of probation recommended sentencing,
the recidivism rates are low.' 14' The few cases where judges diverge from
the commission's recommended sentence show that the rate of recidivism
4
is much higher. 1
pjimo6pr.cfm [hereinafter Press Release, Bureau of Justice Statistics]; Mo.

SENTENCING ADVI-

SORY COMM'N, RECOMMENDED SENTENCING: BIENNIAL REPORT 2009 (2009),

available at http:/l

www.mosac.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=45433.
133 Press Release, Mo. Sentencing Advisory Comm'n, supra note II.
134 Id.
135 Press Release, Bureau of Justice Statistics, supra note 132.
136 Id.
137 Missouri: Overview of Correctional System, NAT'L INST. CORRECTIONS, http://nicic.gov/
StateStats (follow "Missouri" hyperlink; then follow "2008 Cost" hyperlink) (last visited Oct.
8, 20 i) (showing that the national average taxpayer cost per inmate in zoo8 was $24,142).
138 Id.
139 See Press Release, Mo. Sentencing Advisory Comm'n, supra note II;Mo. SENTENCING ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 132, at 50-56 (for a statistical analysis of the risk assessment
factors and recidivism rates).
140 Press Release, Mo. Sentencing Advisory Comm'n, supra note i I.
141 Mo. SENTENCING ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 132, at 44.
142 Id. ("When the recommended sentence is Probation and the actual sentence is Prison then the recidivism rates are much higher, whether measured by new incarcerations or new
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CONCLUSION

Missouri's recent success in reducing recidivism and bucking national
trends of rising prison costs and incarceration rates through meaningful
reforms are encouraging - especially considering that just five years ago,
Missouri was facing the same correctional challenges Kentucky currently
faces today. Missouri's success, however, did not materialize out of thin
air. Missouri's reform policies emerged as a result of the willingness of
its policy makers to face the source of its mounting budget problem and
tackle it head-on. After all, the first step to recovery is admitting that
there is a problem. That is why it is heartening that, despite Kentucky's
continued adherence to failing criminal justice policies and its widening
budget deficit, the out-of-control corrections spending and skyrocketing
incarceration rates have not gone unnoticed.
At the urging of a bipartisan group of Kentucky's leading lawmakers in
early 2010, the Kentucky General Assembly passed legislation to create the
Task Force on the Penal Code and Controlled Substances Act, comprised
of members from all branches of state government that are assigned to
develop strategies for reducing recidivism while controlling corrections
spending.143 The task force's recent partnership with the PEW Center on
the States further signals the state's budding commitment to reformation of
its costly penal policies."' According to a press release issued by the office
of Kentucky Governor Steve Beshear, "[tihe goal of the partnership is to
give the state a better return on its public safety investment by analyzing
the prison population and associated cost drivers to develop tailored policy
options that will generate savings that could be reinvested in evidencebased' public safety measures."' 45 Echoing the Democratic governor's
sentiment and demonstrating that the Commonwealth's initiative
garners bipartisan support, Kentucky Senate President David Williams, a
Republican, stated:
As national chairman of the Council of State Governments, I have
collaborated closely with the Pew Center on the States as they
have worked in several states to develop thoughtful sentencing
and corrections policies that maintain the security of citizens
and ensure the effective use of tax dollars. I appreciate their
involvement in Kentucky and look forward to implementing
convictions and the rates are similar to the recidivism rates for prison sentences. When the
actual sentence is Probation and the recommended sentence is Prison, which occurs in 31% of
prison recommended sentencing, the recidivism rates are also high.").
143 State Initiatives: Kentucky, RIGHT ON CRIME, https://www.rightoncrime.com//reformin-action/state-initiatives/kentucky/ (last visited Oct. 8, 201i).
144 Id.
145 Press Release, The Pew Charitable Trusts, supranote 30.
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their policy suggestions. 46
If Governor Beshear and Senate President Williams are sincere in
their goal to rehabilitate Kentucky's broken criminal sentencing system
and control corrections spending through reducing prison population
and incarceration costs, the Missouri model-with its proven success
and feasibility of implementation-seems to be an obvious point of
rescue. Namely, Missouri's reforms have successfully addressed the main
policy goals of Kentucky lawmakers: to generate savings while reducing
recidivism. Moreover, extra-legal factors that influence the feasibility of
the Missouri policies such as the political crosscurrents and cultural attitude
towards the judiciary are present in Kentucky. Given the Commonwealth's
obvious incarceration and budget crises, it appears that-practically
speaking-serious reforms like those implemented in Missouri would not
be too tough of a sale to the Kentucky taxpayer. While comprehensively
enhancing judicial discretion and providing judges with a comparative cost
analysis of alternative sentences might not garner much support in fiscally
sound times, in today's budget conscious world, a serious argument can
be made that it is imprudent not to consider such measures. If Kentucky
is ever to reform its sentencing policy, now - in the midst of one of the
Commonwealth's darkest fiscal hours-is the time.
The lesson to be learned from Missouri's novel sentencing system is
that states can push for reforms that both ensure the safety of their citizens
and respect their dwindling budgets. Success is dependent upon the
openness of Kentucky's policymakers to leave behind the stubborn "lock
'em up and throw away the key" mentality and accept that a tough on
crime approach does not have to be tough on the Commonwealth's budget.

146 State Initiatives: Kentucky, supra note 143.

